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In response to corruption and inefficient state institutions in recipient countries some foreign aid
donors decrease bilateral government-to-government aid flows and increase the share of bilateral
aid by outsourcing delivery to non-state development actors. Other donor governments continue
to support state management of aid despite corruption and inefficiency, seeking to strengthen
recipient states. These cross-donor differences can be attributed in large measure to different
national orientations about the appropriate role of the state in public service delivery. Countries
that place a high premium on market-efficiency (e.g. US, UK, Sweden) will outsource aid
delivery in poorly governed recipient countries to improve the likelihood that aid reaches the
intended beneficiaries of services. In contrast, states whose own political economies emphasize
a strong state in service provision (e.g. France, Germany, Japan) continue to support state
provision. This argument is borne out by a variety of tests, including statistical analysis of
dyadic time-series cross-section aid allocation data and individual-level survey data on a cross-
national sample of senior foreign aid officials. To understand different aid policies, one needs to
understand the political economies of donors.
Introduction
Foreign aid is justified as a response to needs in poor countries, but its quantity and form de-
pend on political and economic conditions in donor countries. For instance, research has long
recognized that aid serves as an instrument of state-craft used to advance developmental and
non-developmental goals, which can include policy-concessions, recipient government stability,
counter-terrorism, access to natural resources, and democratization.1 Yet, donors differ signif-
icantly in bilateral aid giving. Domestic determinants of donor activity include donor country
size, socioeconomic values, political party ideology, welfare institutions, budget size, domestic
development NGOs, aid agencies, decision-makers’ perceptions of their states’ role in world
politics, and elites’ ideas about why aid is valuable.2
These existing studies on bilateral aid rely on the assumption that bilateral ODA activities
are fungible government-to-government aid transfers. In reality, however, donors channel bi-
lateral aid through multiple channels outside the recipient government, including international
and local NGOs, international organizations like the United Nations or the Global Fund,3 and
even private companies. For example, in 2007 OECD governments outsourced over 30 per-
cent (approximately US$ 41 billion) of their bilateral aid to non-state development actors -thus
“bypassing” the recipient government. Previous research shows that donor governments, on
average, employ bypass tactics in environments where poor governance poses a direct threat to
effective aid delivery through the government-to-government channel. Out of effectiveness con-
cerns, donor officials turn to third-party actors for more effective aid delivery channels. While
donor governments such as the United States and the United Kingdom closely follow this de-
livery model, other donors, such as France and Germany are less likely to resort to bypass
tactics under conditions of poor governance.4 This raises the central question for this paper:
why are some OECD donors more likely to use government bypass tactics in countries with poor
governance, while others prefer to stick with government-to-government aid?
I address this puzzle by developing and testing a model of endogenous aid delivery that
accounts for heterogeneity in donor delivery preferences. I argue that donor differences in aid
delivery are predicated on national orientations about the appropriate role of the state in service
1e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Kono and Montinolla 2009; Boutton and Carter 2013; Kapfer et al
2007; Wright 2009, respectively.
2e.g. Bertoli et al 2008; Lumsdaine 1993; Therien and Noel 2000; Chong and Gradstein 2008; Lundsgaarde 2012;
Lancaster 2006; Milner and Tingley 2011; Breuning 1995; Van der Veen 2011, respectively.
3International organizations like the UN increasingly rely on bilateral aid as source of financing, which increases
the amount of projects that they implement directly on behalf of donor governments (e.g. Knack 2013a). Bilateral
funding of international organizations is distinct from multilateral aid.
4OECD Creditor Reporting System 2012.
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delivery. Foreign aid officials from governments with neoliberal political-economic policies turn
to bypass when the public sector in the recipient country poses high risks for aid delivery. In
donor countries where the organization of the political economy emphasizes a stronger state in
service delivery, officials stress the importance of the public sector for the recipient country’s
long-term development and thus manage risks through direct involvement in the implementation
of government-to-government aid.5 While statist donor elites view the role of aid as catalytic,
contributing to development and growth by strengthening state capacity, their counterparts
from market-oriented political economies view aid as an effort to directly improve the lives of
the poor abroad, if necessary without engaging the recipient government.
This study makes three contributions to the foreign aid literature. First, it establishes that
aid delivery mechanisms are a fundamental feature of foreign aid decision-making. Second,
the paper presents a new framework that builds on separate foreign aid research agendas by
showing how donor and recipient characteristics interact to influence donor decision-making.
Third, the paper illuminates previously unexplored linkages between the organization of domes-
tic political economies and foreign aid policy. By tracing the application of neoliberal economic
policy in its application to foreign aid delivery across donor countries, I show that the domestic
political economy of donors profoundly affects how they provide bilateral foreign aid.6 Thus,
the results of this paper directly reinforce a prominent line of work by Katzenstein, Gourevitch,
Simmons, Milner, Mansfield and Pevehouse, Nelson, and others that emphasizes the importance
of domestic factors on foreign policy.7
A Two-Part Theory of Bypass in Bilateral Aid
Every year donor governments provide bilateral aid to developing countries, many of which
exhibit unproductive situations in which aid goes to waste through corruption or limited ca-
pacity on the part of state institutions.8 One common approach to reducing the risk of aid
capture9 in bad governance environments is to outsource the delivery of foreign aid to non-state
5These mechanisms include conditionality, project-type foreign aid, and technical assistance.
6The importance of political economy structures has also been demonstrated in a series of studies that explain
comparative political economy outcomes (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001).
7e.g. Katzenstein 1978; Gourevitch 1986; Simmons 1994; Milner 1997; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Nelson
2014; See Lake 2009 for a review of this literature.
8As analytical and empirical work on donors’ aid implementation record shows, aid transfers between donor and
recipient governments are at great risk of aid capture through agency problems and bureaucratic inefficiencies in
poorly governed countries (e.g. Svensson 2000).
9I define aid capture broadly as resulting from the mismanagement of aid in the recipient, either by intentional
diversion of aid through corrupt authorities/bureaucrats or the waste of aid due to a lack of absorptive capacity.
This definition differs from Svensson’s (2000), Winters (Forthcoming) and Jablonski (Forthcoming) who define aid
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actors. These non-state actors include local and international NGOs, international organiza-
tions, and private development contractors. This tactic has been described as bypass. Recent
experimental evaluations in Kenya by Bold et al (2013) and Duflo et al (2012) suggest that
NGO-administered school programs perform better than government-administered programs in
improving education. Thus, there is some evidence that bypass can be a more effective delivery
channel.
However, bypass is hotly contested among donor countries and marked differences exist
in the degree to which donor governments pursue bypass tactics abroad. While some donor
governments utilize bypass tactics in bad governance environments, others make more limited
use of it under similar conditions. Instead, the latter are more likely to pursue tactics that engage
the government but that include mechanisms of control and oversight. Like bypass tactics, this
more “hands-on” delivery tactic is designed to mitigate the rise of aid capture in recipient
countries. Unlike bypass, this delivery mechanism hinges on engagement with the recipient
government. These contrasting approaches raise the question of why donor governments use
opposing strategies for pursuing the same goal in similar environments.
The ideas that undergird the organization of donor governments’ political economies provide
a potential answer to this puzzle. I argue that the debate about the appropriate strategy to
deal with the risk of aid capture in poorly governed environments is largely ideological, as
it reflects contrasting conceptions about the role of the state in aid delivery. Bypass tactics
under conditions of bad governance emphasize efficiency gains in aid delivery through the use of
market-type mechanisms. “Hands-on” government-to-government aid delivery emphasizes the
importance of continued state engagement and capacity-building in aid delivery under similar
conditions. It is for that reason that we expect national structures in donor countries to matter
for aid delivery.
For this paper, the primary division among political economies is the mode of governance,
the “kind” of state involvement in goods and service delivery rather than its size. The central
question is who implements public sector policy - i.e. to whom the money gets channeled for
implementation. During the first decades after World War II, Keynesian economic theory led to
a broad consensus about the importance of the state in development.10 Across Western indus-
trialized states, governments opted for a strong role of the state in delivering goods and services.
In response to global economic crises in the 1970s, neoliberal ideas led to a significant change
in how the state was perceived across many OECD countries. In response, many governments
capture as acts of corruption.
10e.g. Tanzi 2011
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re-organized their political economies on principles of reducing the state, deregulating markets,
and privatizing government services. In goods and service provision, neoliberal beliefs demanded
government change from the role of direct provider into a role that focused on channeling public
resources to attain policy goals in an efficient and effective manner -by creating and relying
on an open market where public and private entities compete for contracts to implement pol-
icy.11 This separation of demand from supply was famously captured by Osborne and Gaebler
(1992) as “steering not rowing.” Greater emphasis was put on the use of benchmarks to indicate
the efficiency and/or effectiveness of a program or implementing entity.12 Knowledge of and
perceptions about the relative effectiveness of public and private delivery channels increasingly
determines who wins delivery contracts in goods and service provision.13 Over the last thirty
years, as more governments adopted benchmarking practices in resource allocation, the rate of
outsourcing of public responsibilities to non-state entities has increased.14
Today, the United Kingdom leads the outsourcing ranking where expenditure of government
outsourcing to non-state actors for goods and services used by “general government” are at
14 percent of GDP, closely followed by the United States, Canada, and Australia.15 Since the
early 1990s we also observe a consistent increase in the privatization of public service delivery
in Scandinavian countries: severe recessions in the 1990s lead to a crisis of the welfare state,
which in turn, led to significant changes in the role and institutional character of the state in
the economy and public goods provision.16 Across Scandianvian economies, the introduction of
private markets in welfare states, including health, child and elderly care, and education,17 led
to a paradigmatic shift in national orientation from big to small state in service delivery delivery.
Today, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland spend around ten percent of their GDP on government
outsourcing to non-state actors for goods and services used by “general government.”18
I argue that national orientations about the role of the state in domestic goods and service
provision affect foreign aid decision-making. Officials approach delivery decisions abroad in
ways that are analogous to their practices at home: i.e. they rely on benchmarking practices for
determining the relative effectiveness of the recipient government in implementing aid projects,
11Bertelli 2012.
12This form of public sector governance has its intellectual origins in New Public Management (NPM). The key
idea in NPM is that of performance measurement, which requires the use of benchmarks to assess effectiveness.
13e.g. Hood 1995.
14Metcalfe and Richards 1990; Lundsgaard 2002. The degree to which performance-measurement has been adopted
varies across OECD countries, however (Volkov and Baron 2011).
15OECD National Account Statistics Database 2011
16Andersen, Holmstrom, Honkapohja, Korkman, Soderstrom, and Vartiainen 2007.
17e.g. Gingrich 2011, Ansell 2010.
18OECD National Account Database 2013.
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as compared to aid delivery through other means.19 The focus of benchmarking is on risks
associated with government-to-government delivery. Knowledge about the risk of aid capture
through the recipient public sector then affects perceptions about the relative effectiveness of
the recipient government as a delivery channel. Good governance signals a lower probability of
aid capture through the state, while bad governance signals a higher probability of aid capture
through corrupt and inefficient state institutions.
When quality of governance is high, officials, across political economies, have a preference
for government-to-government aid. By working with the recipient state, donors can continue
to exert policy influence. Good governance also serves as an indicator for the existence of
indigenous development capacity and the government’s commitment to development. Such
environments provide important local economies of scale that can increase the returns aid.21 In
poor governance environments, on the other hand, knowledge about high risks for government-
to-government aid transfers makes it less likely that neoliberal officials enter in aid delivery
contracts with the recipient government. Because these countries have great demand for foreign
assistance22 neoliberal donors turn to alternative mechanisms of aid delivery, such as NGOs
based in donor countries, international organizations, and private companies.23
As a former senior U.S. official highlights: “We have a high stated concern for fiduciary- and
results-risks in foreign aid. These concerns translate into why a lot more of U.S. assistance is
provided through NGOs or private firms. If we want our food security program to lift 15 million
people out of poverty in five years in a given country, then it is hard to turn the money over to
the recipient government and expect them to reach the targets, especially when the government
is corrupt and lacks absorptive capacity.”24 Another official elaborates further: “Governance is
a big issue for us. We always care about it. When we learn of severe corruption in government
we turn to our NGOs to deliver our assistance. Or, alternatively, we work with multilateral
organizations like the UN Office for Drugs and Crimes [in Central Asia, added by author ] by
funding individual activities because they are well placed and they can deliver for us. We need
to make sure that people get our help. If we continued working with the government we would
19According to more than seventy author interviews with senior officials from seven OECD donor countries20
decision-makers regularly examine a recipient country’s performance in corruption, government effectiveness, bureau-
cratic quality, and the rule of law.
21Recent empirical and theoretical research discusses the positive effects of engaging with the local public sector in
good governance environments e.g. Winters 2010; Hefeker and Michaelowa 2005.
22Radelet 2004.
23Compared to recipient governments, these non-state actors are more easily monitored and held accountable than
corrupt recipient governments.
24Author’s interview with former senior US government official, Paris, France, September 25, 2013.
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not get anywhere.”25
On the other hand, Japan, South Korea, France, and Germany place greater emphasis
on maintaining the state’s “rowing” function -which implies a more active role of the state
in development, and more specifically in service delivery. While these economies, too, have
increased competition in the public sector over the last two decades by introducing market-type
mechanisms into goods and service delivery, they have done so to a lesser degree. According
to the National Accounts Database these four countries spend less than 8 percent of GDP
on government outsourcing.26 Public sectors have retained their capabilities to design and
implement policy. In these countries, the state not only generates the demand but also assumes
the role of the agent that generates supply in-house (e.g. France) - or, alternatively, coordinates
the supply via institutionalized, not necessarily market-based cooperation with non-state entities
(e.g. Germany).27
A senior Japanese government official explains the affinity between domestic and foreign
policy decision-making, and their implications for objectives in foreign aid: “The philosophy of
Japanese aid is, in part, based on our own development after the World War II where we had a
very strong state leadership and state capacity. In essence, Japan’s growth was led by the state.
We were not a socialist country but it was civil servants who planned development and led the
country and this was successful to a certain extent. And we believe that in developing countries
there should be a capacity on the state-side to be able to plan ahead and manage resources
and allocate them adequately and properly. We place a lot of emphasis on working with the
recipient state, working with public servants to realize a collective solution to development, just
like we do at home.”28
Thus, donor officials from countries where the state assumes a more involved function in
service delivery are less likely to bypass recipient governments under conditions of bad gover-
nance. To mitigate risk of aid capture in poor governance environments, these donor officials
prefer “hands-on” involvement in government-to-government aid transfers,29 whereby donor
governments can address inefficiencies through increased technical support and donor oversight.
25Author’s interview with senior US government official, State Department, Washington DC, June 09, 2009.
26OECD National Accounts Statistics Database 2011.
27This type of cooperation is the result of corporatist bargaining or historical association (see e.g. Hall and Soskice
2001).
28Interview with senior Japanese Official, Member of the Japanese Permanent Delegation to OECD, Paris, August
12, 2013.
29It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully explore the range of “hands-on” aid delivery strategies. This paper
focuses on explaining variation in bypass tactics. Evidence about the effect of political economy on government-to-
government delivery tactics (e.g. technical cooperation aid) fully supports the paper’s central thesis. It is available
from the author upon request.
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Advocates of this tactic emphasize the importance of engaging with the public sector and im-
proving local institutions for long-term development. As a French aid official suggests during
the interview: “In France we respond to and penalize corrupt practices in the public sector but
not by cutting aid to the government and shifting it to NGOs. We mitigate corruption through
our strong due diligence process within the AFD [Agence Franc¸aise de De´veloppement, added
by author ]. In fact, France is at the maximum of government-to-government cooperation where
we work closely with the institutions of our partners. If they have weak institutions we need to
continue working with them, and accompany them with our capacity. We give them frequent
advice where needed. We have almost daily dialogue with our partners on sector program choices
and on the implementation of the projects. In fact we have offices of the AFD with experts in
almost every country in which we work. We consider that it is not a good way to accept project
implementation from an agency outside their own local structure.”30 This suggests that donors
can resort to different tactics to mitigate the risk of aid capture in recipient countries. Consis-
tent with this paper’s argument, the choice of delivery mechanism depends on donor countries’
political economies.
A potential rejoinder to this argument linking donor political economies and foreign aid de-
livery is the possibility that foreign policy is a policy arena completely distinct from domestic
policy. Indeed a rich literature on the “Two Presidencies” in American Politics seeks to deter-
mine whether presidents exercise more power over foreign policy than domestic policy. While
the evidence remains mixed, several studies suggest that presidential influence is greater in for-
eign policy.31 My argument, on the other hand, asserts that domestic economic policy-making
encroaches on foreign economic policy via shared beliefs about the role of the state.32 These
beliefs not only influence the organization of donor political economies but they ensure their
persistence by shaping rules and regulations across policy areas.33
I identify cross-cutting legislative frameworks as a primary mechanism through which na-
tional orientations about the appropriate role of the state influence domestic and foreign policy
making. To illustrate, I draw on U.S. legislation that anchors the “three M’s”34 -markets, man-
agers, and measurement- in public sector governance. The U.S. Performance and Results Act
(GPRA) from 1993 drafted under G H Bush, signed by Clinton35 -and revised by Obama in
30Interview with senior French government official, Permanent Delegation to the OECD/DAC, Paris, July 3, 2013.
31Wildavsky 1966, Sullivan 1991, Peterson 1994.
32Milner and Tingley 2014 argue that domestic politics influences foreign policy via domestic interest group
pressures.
33See Goldstein and Keohane 1993 for applications about the influence of ideas on foreign policy.
34Ferlie, Fitzgerald, Pettigrew 1996
35www.whitehouse.gov/omb/mgmt-gpra/gplaw2m
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2010,3637 tied performance results to budgetary decisions. It required all federal agencies to
produce -a strategic plan with organizational goals and objectives; -a performance plan includ-
ing measurement and data on meeting objectives; and -a performance report including actual
performance data. The legislation increased pressure across all agencies to carefully bench-
mark and manage for effectiveness by relying on markets. GPRA not only resulted in increased
performance-based evaluation. It also caused a shift in resources away from programming and
in-house policy implementation, which resulted in capacity loss in these functions. GPRA had
direct effects on foreign aid agencies including USAID. It required USAID to adopt greater
performance-based measurement of foreign aid program, and simultaneously contract out US-
AID technical and program design functions to private actors in order to compensate for loss in
operational capacity.38 Domestic government agencies, like the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget, ensure that these legislative reform initiatives are properly enforced. In Sweden agen-
cies like the Agency for Public Management and the National Financial Management Authority
play important roles in enforcing public management reforms in foreign aid.3940
Insofar as donors seek to promote economic development I argue that decision-making in
foreign aid delivery is shaped by the interaction of a donor’s national orientation about the
role of the state in public service delivery and governance characteristics in the recipient coun-
try.41 Based on this logic, I advance the study’s main hypothesis: Donor officials from political
economies that emphasize the market in goods and service delivery should be more likely to by-
pass the public sector in recipient countries with poor governance quality than their counterparts
from political economies that emphasize a stronger role of the state in goods provision.
Research Design, Data and Measures
I explain variation in donor outsourcing tactics across 23 OECD donor countries. The universe of
recipient countries includes ODA eligible countries as defined by the OECD. I use cross-national
observational and elite survey data to test the argument. First I test my claim at the level
36www.whitehouse.gov/omb/performance/gprm-act
37GPRA has its intellectual roots in NPM.
38Natsios 2010.
39Christensen and Laegreid 2013.
40For instance, in 2011, the Swedish Agency for Public Management published a critical of Swedish aid policy-
concluding that the existence of too many uncoordinated policy documents weakened the scope for government
management for results. The report triggered immediate changes in aid policy consistent with recommendations
(Oden 2013).
41This argument does not maintain that donors use aid only to maximize development. The scope condition for
my argument is that in the cases to which it applies, economic development is one of their major objectives.
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of the donor-recipient dyad-year -where temporal domain ranges from 2005 to 2011 because of
data availability. Second, I present originally collected survey data on a cross-country sample
of senior aid officials from donor countries where public sectors rely on markets for the delivery
of services (United States and Sweden) and their counterparts from countries where the state
assumes a more active role in service delivery (Japan, France, and Germany).
Cross-Country Analysis of Aid Delivery
The dependent variable: outsourcing in bilateral aid
The outcome of interest is donor decisions to outsource the delivery of foreign aid to non-state
actors. I construct this measure using data drawn from the OECD CRS aid activity database.42
Information on the channel of delivery records the amount of bilateral aid flows channeled
through different channel categories. I distinguish between government-to-government aid and
aid channeled through non-state development actors. I define government-to-government aid as
any aid activity that involves the recipient government as an implementing partner. In contrast,
aid delivered through non-state development channels does not engage government authorities,
and goes to non-state actors for purpose of project implementation. The primary non-state
actors in this category include international and local NGOs, international organizations, public
private partnerships, and private companies. There is also a small residual channel category
that includes research institutes and networks as non-state implementation partners.
I operationalize the decision to outsource with a continuous measure, capturing the propor-
tion of aid delivered through non-state development actors. Figure 1 presents the proportion of
non-state aid each donor country allocates (y-axis) across the full volume of aid flows in 2009.
Among OECD donors, Finland channels the greatest proportion of aid through bypass actors,
nearly 70 percent, followed by Canada, Norway, and Ireland. The United States outsources more
than 30 percent of its bilateral funds. At the low end of the bypass axis are France, Greece, and
Korea, which send less than eight percent of their aid through bypass channels.
[Figure 1 here]
42The OECD began collecting information on the “channel of delivery” in 2004.
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The explanatory variables: donor political economy and quality of re-
cipient governance
Measuring national delivery preferences for goods and services: My argument builds
on differences in national orientations about the role of the state in goods and service delivery.
I conceptualize the main division among donor countries to be based on different mechanisms
through which governments deliver goods and services. In some countries neoliberal beliefs pro-
mote competitive markets in delivery systems. In other countries more statist beliefs advocate
non-market relations in goods and service delivery, either via in-house delivery or institutional-
ized delivery agreements with non-state actors. To capture this variation in ideas that undergird
the organization of political economies I rely on pre-existing theoretical frameworks in the study
of comparative political economy.
In a first step I leverage the binary division developed in the Varieties of Capitalism tradi-
tion, which distinguishes political economies by types of governance modes.43 In liberal market
economies (LMEs) governments organize economic activity largely through markets -and eco-
nomic decision-making is a function of market-based competition. Consistent with VoC coding,
I group the following Anglo-American donor countries in the neoliberal market category: United
States, United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. To account for recent
paradigmatic changes in national orientations from non-market to market-based delivery sys-
tems across Scandinavian countries44 I include Scandinavian countries in the LME category.45
In coordinated market-economies (CMEs), on the other hand, governments frequently organize
economic activity through non-market-based relationships that emerge from corporatist bargain-
ing and/or include various forms of state intervention and regulation. I group France, Japan,
South Korea, Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium in the CME category.
I create an “other” category which subsumes countries with hybrid political economy types that
include Spain, Portugal, and Greece.46 I use the “other” category as baseline category against
which I statistically evaluate aid delivery patterns of LMEs and CMEs. Italy is excluded due
to missingness of aid delivery data.
In a second step I further differentiate the binary division to account for differences in state
43e.g. Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001; Franzese 2002; Hall and Gingrich 2009.
44Steinmo 2010; Cohen et al 2011; Gingrich 2011 offer compelling accounts of this change.
45The results do not change if I exclude Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland from the the LME sample in the
analyses.
46The Varieties literature has labeled them “Mediterranean Market Economies (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001). Quinn
and Inclan 1997 label these countries “syndicalist” (Quinn and Inclan 1997). In addition, Greece, Spain, and Portugal
differ from the other OECD donors insofar as they were recently recipients of EU assistance themselves.
10
structures among CME states. Katzenstein’s and Evan’s work shows that different kinds of state
structures create distinct action capacities, and thus define the range of roles the state plays.47
For instance, the professional bureaucracies in France historically produce and implement goods
and services in-house.48 We find similar patterns in Japan and South Korea. Germany also relies
on in-house delivery capacity but, simultaneously, delegates goods and service delivery to non-
state actors with whom the government has an institutionalized relationship. The latter type
of delivery through non-state actors is not a function of market-competition. Rather it arises
from corporatist bargaining. Katzenstein labels this political economy type neocorporatist.49
I follow suit and include Germany, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands in
this category. Traditionally, Scandinavian economies have been described as neocorporatist
where the state delivers goods and services through institutionalized arrangements with non-
state actors. However, economic crises in the 1990s brought about a fundamental change in
delivery mechanism toward markets. I thus add a fourth political economy type that I label
“Scandinavian.” Again I include Spain, Portugal, and Greece in the “other” category and use
them as reference category in the statistical tests.
In a third step, I draw on a proximate expression of how political economic order occurs in
politics in donor countries -a measure of “domestic government outsourcing” of services used
by the general government as percent of GDP. I expect this measure to be determined by ideas
that undergird the organization of political economies, which are captured by the previous
political economy types. These data are from the OECD National Accounts Database and
measure the degree to which governments use private contractors or the third sector to provide
support services or perform back-office functions.50 These data are only available for 2000
and 2009. In 2009, domestic government outsourcing of goods and services used by general
government as percent of GDP represented an average of twelve percent across the OECD
donor governments. In Figure 2 I plot the level of Government Outsourcing across all donor
governments in 2009. This measure varies considerably from 3.5 percent in Japan to twelve
percent in the United Kingdom.51 The outsourcing average in 2009 is only a two-percent
increase from the average outsourcing in 2000, which implies that outsourcing does not change
much over time. In subsequent analyses, I therefore employ a country’s outsourcing average
47Katzenstein 1976, 1985; Evans 1995.
48e.g. Suleiman 1974
49e.g. Katzenstein 1985.
50OECD National Accounts Database 2011.
51For robustness, I construct an alternative proximate expression measure, government outsourcing of goods and
services used by general government as percent of government spending, and plot the distribution in Figure A1 in
the Appendix. The subsequent results do not change if I include the alternative outsourcing measure.
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between 2000 and 2009.
[Figure 2 here]
Indeed, Figure 3 demonstrates that domestic government outsourcing is highly correlated
with political economy types: while the Scandinavian type slightly tops the neoliberal one in
domestic government outsourcing, the difference between these two (9.1 and 9.8 percent) and
statist and neocorporatist types (4.5 and 4.9 percent) is considerable.
[Figure 3 here]
Measuring quality of recipient governance: When determining aid delivery tactics, aid
decision-makers assess the likelihood of aid reaching the intended outcome in the recipient
country. If state institutions are of poor quality, donor officials expect a higher probability
of aid capture. In advancing the argument that national orientations condition the selection
of delivery tactics when facing risk, I presume that, among officials from neoliberal economies
there is a greater propensity to rely on bypass than among officials from more statist political
economies. The quality of recipient governance is, therefore, an important variable in the model.
I draw on data from the Governance Matters project.52 I construct the Recipient Governance
variable by including corruption control, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of
law as indicators and averaging across them for any given year. The governance variable ranges
between -2.5 and +2.5, which I rescaled to 0 and 5, with higher values representing a higher
quality of governance. Among aid-receiving countries there is no country with a governance
rating of 4 and higher.53 Subsequent graphical illustrations will provide a 0-4 range of the
variable.
In some aid-receiving countries, however, most notably in failed states, donors might face
functionally incompetent governments, thus rendering bypass the sole aid delivery channel. To
address this issue of constraint, I present the subsequent descriptive data using four different
development environments in recipient countries that account for functional competence.54
52Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011. The project offers data for six governance dimensions: voice and ac-
countability, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, rule of law, corruption control, and political stability and
violence. I select this particular source of governance measures because author interviews with donor officials sug-
gest that donor government and aid agency representatives consult this publicly available governance source in their
assessments. In over half of the author’s interviews with donor officials, respondents specifically mentioned World
Bank governance data as informing their assessments.
53See a histogram of Recipient Governance in Figure A2 in the Appendix.
54In robustness tests below, I exclude the top 10 fragile states, using data from the “Foreign Policy Failed States
Index to determine “fragility.” The results are the same.
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To illustrate recent donor aid delivery decisions in various situations of governance quality, I
plot donor development cooperation for aid-receiving countries in 2009, where individual donors
contributed at least 2 million US dollars in development assistance. Figure 4 shows the bypass
behavior of all active OECD donors in four recipient countries that vary in their governance
characteristics. The countries include Sudan (a poorly governed, “failed” state), Sri Lanka
(still poorly governed, functionally competent state), Tanzania (a better-governed, functionally
competent state), and Cape Verde (a well-governed, functionally competent state) across the
full range of possible bypass behavior (as captured along the x-axis).
[Figure 4 here]
In the Sudan, which has a governance score of 0.86, all donor governments, with the excep-
tion of Greece, bypass the Sudanese government with more than 50 percent of their bilateral
assistance. In the case of Sri Lanka, which has a governance score of 1.90, a majority of donors
bypass with more than 50 percent of their bilateral assistance, and some donors outsourcing a
somewhat lower proportion. Tanzania, scores a 2.3 on the scale, and, as expected, the majority
of donors, with the exception of Norway, Finland, and Switzerland, channel less than half of
their aid through non-state channels. In Cape Verde, which scores 2.98 on the governance scale,
donors channel only a small proportion through non-state actors.
While this graph provides descriptive evidence that donors, on average, respond to the quality
of recipient institutions, differences nonetheless remain across donors. For instance, Japan and
France do not outsource foreign aid in Sudan and Sri Lanka to the same extent as the United
States, the United Kingdom and Sweden. Moving from Sri Lanka to Tanzania the latter three
countries exhibit a different delivery tactic in favor of working with the recipient government,
now more similar to Japan and France.
Figure 5 presents descriptive statistics that provide prima facie evidence that differences
in aid delivery tactics exist across political economy types. The y-axes represent the mean
share of bypass. This mean share is separated into aid recipients that have “Bad Governance,”
depicting countries with governance score of 1.5 and lower, and aid recipients that have “Good
Governance,” or a governance score of 2.0 and higher. The whisker plots are useful for illustrating
the change in outsourcing share across the two types of political economies when moving from
environments of high probability of aid capture to low probability ones. The raw data indicate
that, regardless of political economy type, donors are responsive to the probability of aid capture
in the recipient country. Importantly, however, we observe that the degree to which countries
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bypass recipient governments varies by political economy type. The left graph depicts differences
between the CME and LME countries, whereby the LME countries exhibit greater reliance on
markets than their CME counterpart, which is indicated by the relatively steep drop in bypass
shares as the quality of governance changes from bad to poor. In the right graph we find that
neoliberal and Scandinavian political economies exhibit the steepest relationship when moving
from poorly to better-governed recipient countries in the left panel.
[Figure 5 here]
Controls
As the previous literature on aid policy maintains, various other factors shape donor deci-
sions about the allocation of aid resources, including other recipient characteristics and non-
developmental donor goals. I include them as controls to provide a fully specified model. All
time-varying right-hand side variables are lagged one year. I control for Democracy based on the
understanding that some donors may conceive of democratic institutions as political constraints
that limit the ability of recipient governments and bureaucratic officials to capture aid flows.
Democracy is measured using the combined score of the Freedom House civil liberty and political
rights indicators.55 To make the scale of the measure more intuitive I invert Democracy so that
“1” represents the lowest level of democracy, while “7” stands for the highest level of democ-
racy.56 I control for Natural Disaster Deaths based on the understanding that a greater number
of deaths caused by natural disasters in the aid recipient, as recorded by EM-DAT, may prompt
donors to provide a larger share of the pie to non-state development actors that are specialized
in post disaster reconstruction efforts.57 Following a similar logic, low-scale Civil Conflict, as
recorded by Gleditsch et al’s PRIO database, may create grievances that provide incentives
for donors to favor more outcome-orientated aid delivery about ensuring that aid reaches the
affected, thus increasing donor propensity to bypass.58 I further include Distance to account
for the geographical proximity between donor and the aid-receiving countries. As distance be-
tween donors and aid-receiving countries grows, government-to-government relations between
donor and recipient governments are expected to weaken, thus increasing donor propensity to
channel aid through non-state development actors. The distance data are drawn from Bennett
55Freedom House 2012.
56The Freedom House data are widely used among donor governments in their assessments of democracy. In
robustness tests I use polity2 as measure for the democracy. The results are very similar.
57EM-DAT 2013
58Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand 2012.
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and Stam’s Eugene software and are logged.59 Following previous studies, I also include con-
founders that capture donor non-developmental objectives. Former Colony status, as recorded
by the CIA World Factbook, allows me to account for long-lasting diplomatic ties between the
donor and the aid receiving governments that may bias aid delivery in favor of government-to-
government aid. Trade Intensity, measured as the logged sum of imports and exports between
the recipient and the OECD countries from the IMF-DOT database, is a straightforward indi-
cator of donor efforts to strengthen economic ties with the recipient government.60 To control
for security related donor goals, I include Security Council, which is a binary variable indicating
whether the aid recipient is a rotating member on the UN Security Council. As research by
Kuziemko and Werker finds, donor governments use aid to buy votes from rotating members of
the UN Security Council.61
I incorporate a binary control for Major Power status to account for the fact that major
donors including the US, UK, Japan, Germany, and France use foreign aid to influence policy
abroad. I also include controls for Total Aid Per Capita, as well as Democracy Aid and Social
Sector Aid individually. I would expect democracy aid to have a positive effect on bypass
insofar as democracy aid maybe more likely to be associated with civil society support. By
including Social Sector Aid, I control for the possibility that donors channel aid through non-
state development actors because NGOs and IOs are in a better position to deliver services.
This is distinct from my argument which suggests that donors turn to non-state development
actors because they want to decrease the probability of aid capture.
Analysis and Results
I now estimate the model that examines differences in aid delivery across political economies
using the political economy type measure. I fit a linear OLS model with a log-transformed de-
pendent variable to account for the proportional nature of the bypass share data62 and calculate
clustered standard errors on the recipient country.63 I investigate bias from serial correlation
by applying the Wooldrige test for panel data.64 The significance of the test-statistic (p =
0.029) indicates that autocorrelation may introduce bias in the estimates. I therefore include a
lagged dependent variable in the main specification. The following equation delineates the fully
59Bennett and Stam 2000.
60International Monetary Fund, Database of Trade 2011.
61Kuziemko and Werker 2006.
62I provide a brief discussion of the statistical implications of using a proportional outcome measure, i.e. composi-
tional data analysis, in the Appendix.
63The results are robust to alternative dyadic and donor cluster-specifications.
64Wooldridge 2002, p. 282-283.
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specified statistical model, using the binary (LME, CME) division.65
Bypassit = β0 + β1LaggedBypassit + β2RecipientGovernanceit + (1)
β3PELME,i + β4PELME,i ∗RecipientGovernanceit +
β5PECME,i + β6PECME,i ∗RecipientGovernanceit +
β7Z + ǫit,
where BypassinForeignAid is the continuous log-transformed (OLS) variable, i represents
country and t represents year, LaggedBypass captures the share of bypass in the previous
year, RecipientGovernance denotes the (time-varying) quality of recipient governance, PELME ,
PECME denote the (time-invariant) political economy types of the binary typology, andRecipientGovernance∗
PELME,CMEs denote the respective interactions, Z denotes the vector of (time-varying and
time-invariant) control variables, and ǫit is the error term of the equation. To account for unob-
served confounders across recipient countries and years in the sample I include 2-way year and
recipient fixed effects in the main model specifications, as specified at the bottom of Table 1.66
[Table 1 here]
In Table 1, I present my findings. The first two columns present OLS results for the spec-
ification (Models 1 and 2) that do not include political economy variables. They include the
Recipient Governance measure and other potentially confounding factors as well as donor coun-
try and region fixed effects. This specification allows me to show the average effect of Recipient
Governance prior to introducing the donor invariant political economy measures. Model 2 in-
cludes the lagged dependent variable. The results show that donors, on average, condition
aid delivery tactics on the quality of recipient governance. The coefficient of Recipient Gover-
nance is negative and statistically significant indicating that donors respond to improvements
in governance by reducing the share of aid channeled through non-state development actors.
65The same equation is expanded to include the four-fold measure of political economy types.
66For robustness I re-estimate the main models below, Table 1 Model 4, 6, and 8, with 3-way fixed effects that
include donor, recipient, and year fixed effects. The time-invariant political economy constituent terms are absorbed
by the donor fixed effects, but the interaction terms are time-varying and can be interpreted (see Green, Kim, and
Yoon 2001). Table A2 in the Appendix presents the results for the interaction terms for both the binary and four-fold
political economy typologies, as well as the domestic outsourcing variable. As predicted the coefficient of LMEs*Rec
Gov is negative and statistically significant in Model 1. In Model 2, the Scandinavian*Rec coefficient is negative
and statistically significant. The Neoliberal*Rec Gov coefficient behaves in the predicted direction but just misses
statistical significance. The Domestic Outsourcing*Rec Gov coefficient is negative and statistically significant. The
subsequent Figures A3 and A4 in the Appendix plot the effects of the interaction coefficients across different values
of recipient governance.
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The results in Models 3 to 6 provide support for my main argument, which leads me to
expect that donor countries whose political economies are organized by market-principles are
statistically different from other political economy types in how they respond to variation in
governance quality in the recipient country.67
Models 3 and 4 present results using the binary division between LME and CME types.
I focus on Model 4 since it corrects for serial correlation by including the lagged dependent
variable.68 The coefficient of Recipient Governance expresses the statistical association between
governance and bypass for the omitted group of donors (Spain, Portugal, and Greece), which
is negative, as expected. The interaction term LMEs*Rec Gov is negative, which indicates a
steeper negative slope for the LMEs compared to the slope of the omitted group. The LMEs
constituent term is positive and significant, suggesting that moving from the omitted type to the
LME category yields a significant increase in bypass when governance quality in the recipient
country is 0. The interaction term CMEs*Rec Gov is positive, which indicates a lower degree of
responsiveness to changes in governance quality, relative to the omitted group of donors. The
CMEs constituent term is positive but insignificant.
Significance tests of the respective interactions (p=0.001) and political economy constituent
terms (p=0.001) reveal that the two political economy types differ significantly from each other
in terms of their aid delivery tactics. These findings offer statistical confirmation of initial
inspections of the raw data as presented in Figure 2. Bad governance, as is the case in Sudan
and Sri Lanka, has regulatory influence in terms of bypass tactics for the United States and the
United Kingdom, but not France and Japan. When governance quality is higher, as is the case
in Tanzania, donors who rely on markets in goods delivery are more willing to engage with the
state, as it now represents a trustworthy and capable development partner -whose indigenous
economies of scale are likely to boost the effect of aid delivered through the recipient government
channel.
Models 5 and 6 present results for regressions that include the four-fold political economy
typology. The neoliberal and Scandinavian political economies have positive and significant con-
stituent terms, suggesting that moving from the omitted type to the neoliberal or Scandinavian
category yields a significant increase in bypass when governance quality in the recipient coun-
try is 0. Both political economy types have negative interaction terms, which indicate steeper
negative slopes, relative to those of the “other” group.
67Table A1 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics for Model 4 in Table 1.
68The size of the sample decreases from N=10605 in Model 3 to N=8760 in Model 4 because of the inclusion of the
lagged dependent variable.
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Significance tests of the political economy constituent terms (p=0.001) reveal that the two
political economy types differ significantly from the other statist and neocorporatist political
economies in terms of their aid delivery tactics. Significance tests of the interaction terms
reveal that bypass tactic of neoliberal and Scandinavian political economies under condition of
bad governance is jointly significantly different (p=0.002) from the statist and neocorporatist
political economies. This suggests that they exhibit similar degrees of responsiveness to changes
in recipient governance. Significance tests of the political economy constituent terms show
that, again, neoliberal and Scandinavian aid delivery tactics are jointly statistically significantly
different from the other two categories (p.=0.001) but not statistically different (p=0.66) from
one another.69
In Models 7 and 8 I investigate the effect of domestic government outsourcing- proximate
expression of political economy type. I expect that the interaction of donor outsourcing and
recipient governance contributes to explaining variation in delivery tactics. Consistent with
Models 3 through 6 I focus on the interaction of Government Outsourcing and the quality of
recipient governance, again controlling for potential confounders. Government Outsourcing is
a continuous and time-invariant variable, measuring average government outsourcing between
2000 and 2009. The results in Model 7 and 8 provide statistical confirmation as they indicate
differences in responsiveness to changes in government outsourcing. The coefficients of the
interaction term and the Government Outsourcing constituent term are negative and positive,
respectively.70
Figure 6 plots the marginal effects of political economy type on the share of bypass across
different values of governance quality. The left panel of Figure 6 shows the results of Table 1,
Model 4, which includes the binary division of political economy types. As indicated from the
coefficients, the slope of the LMEs is consistently negative. Differences in statistical significance
are captured through 95% confidence intervals, which I visualize through stars. The stars
indicate that the effects of either political economy type are statistically significantly different
from the omitted “other” category (Spain, Portugal, and Greece), but not from each other.
Moving into the LME category (from the baseline “Other” political economy type) yields a
69One may be concerned that the results of Models 5 and 6 are sensitive to how I group countries into the political
economy types. I address this potential criticism by using the jackknife re-sampling technique. The basic idea
behind the jackknife variance estimator in this application is that it systematically recomputes the statistic dropping
individual donor countries from the political economy type one at a time from the sample wet. From this new set of
replicates of the statistic, an estimate for the bias and an estimate for the variance of the statistic can be calculated.
The changes are slight and negligible and increase my confidence in the specification of Models 5 and 6.
70In Table A3 in the Appendix, I examine the robustness of these results using an alternative outsourcing measure,
where I divide the amount of government outsourcing by government spending. The results do not change.
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statistically significant increase in bypass share by 0.48 in badly governed countries (with a
“1” for governance quality) from the baseline “Other” type. In better governed countries (with
a “3” for governance quality) the statistically significant increase associated with becoming a
Scandinavian political economy type is smaller at 0.4 relative to the baseline “other” political
economy type.
The right panel of Figure 6 shows the results of Table 1, Model 6, which includes the four-fold
division of political economy types. As indicated from the coefficients, the slopes of the Neoliberal
and Scandinavian political economies are similar and consistently negative. There are differences
in statistical significance that are visualized through 95% confidence intervals captured through
stars. Becoming Scandinavian (from the baseline “Other” political economy type) yields a
statistically significant increase in bypass share by 0.48 in badly governed countries (with a
“1” for governance quality) from the baseline “Other” type. In better governed countries (with
a “2” for governance quality) the statistically significant increase associated with becoming a
Scandinavian political economy type is nearly identical relative to the baseline “other” political
economy type. This responsiveness to improvements in recipient governance is very similar
for the classic neoliberal countries, although the differences are not statistically different from
the omitted category. The slope of the Statist political economies is positive. As the quality
of governance improves, this group of countries, compared to the omitted category, does not
increase the share of government-to-government aid. The slope of the Neocorporatist political
economy type is positive, suggesting that, compared to the omitted category, Neocorporatist
countries condition less on governance as the quality of governance increases.
[Figure 6 here]
Figure 7 presents the marginal effects of government outsourcing on the share of bypass
across different values of recipient governance. My argument leads me to expect that increases
in domestic government outsourcing make donor governments more selective in their selection
of aid delivery channels. The x-axis captures different levels of governance quality, ranging
between 0 and 5. Increasing the level of domestic outsourcing yields a statistically significant
decrease in bypass share as the quality of governance increases; and this statistical relationship
holds for the large majority of the data points. In other words, donor political economies that
emphasize efficiency in aid delivery will cut governments slack as they improve their governance
and increase the share of government-to-government aid. The evidence presented in Table 1
supports my thesis that recipient governance plays a significant role in donor decisions about how
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to deliver aid; but that differences exist across donors to the degree in which donor governments
subscribe to bypass delivery tactics.
[Figure 7 here]
Among the controls Trade Intensity, Total Aid Per Capita, Former Colony, andMajor Power
are statistically significant across most models, and the direction of the coefficient behaves in the
predicted direction. While the coefficient of Democracy behaves in the predicted direction, it is
not statistically significantly associated with bypass. This may suggest that donors, on average,
are not as responsive to the quality of government as they are to the quality of governance, all
else equal. This finding, though resulting from a mere control variable, merits further study.
The findings associated with Democracy Aid are inconsistent in terms of coefficient direction but
mostly insignificant. This may be due in part because the measure subsumes both governance
aid and civil society aid -which is channeled through government and civil society, respectively.
Further disaggregation may be of interest for future studies. The results for Civil Conflict are
insignificant, the positive direction of the coefficient was anticipated and suggests that donors
increase the amount of bypass during years of conflict. This, too, merits further study and has
implications for important research that investigates aid allocation during or after episodes of
conflict.7172
Finally, readers might be concerned about potential endogeneity. If bypass undermines or
strengthens state institutions then the quality of governance is endogenous. However, the theory
does not offer clear predictions as to what direction the bias works. In author interviews, more
statist donor government officials have suggested that bypass hurts recipient state institutions
because it diverts resources away from the public sector and towards parallel structures that
often lack alignment with public sector policy. Neoliberal government officials, on the other
hand, believe that bypass creates incentives for recipient governments to improve their gover-
nance quality, as non-state actors compete with the recipient public sector for foreign aid. To
address the concern statistically, I estimate a model that controls for Initial Governance, which
measures the value of governance during the first year of the estimation sample. By measuring
governance at the earliest possible time, I minimizing the effect of bypass on governance. What
71e.g. Flores and Nooruddin 2009; Flores and Nooruddin 2012.
72In the Appendix, Table A4, I examine the robustness of these results with additional control variables, including
both the logged Number of IGOs and Number of INGOs or the Number of NGOs and IGOs in the recipient to account
for potential confounding caused by the presence of international non-state actors, which may increase bypass share
simply by providing more opportunity to bypass. The data are from the Yearbook of International Organizations.
The results do not change.
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is more, recipient governance is a measure that changes slowly over time. Accounting for initial
governance, the results do not change.73
With-in Subject Survey Data Analysis
I further test my argument with cross-country individual-level survey data of 55 senior aid
officials from five countries.74 The countries include France, Japan, Germany, the United States,
and Sweden.75. I selected these countries because of their political economy types. Four of the
five donors are considered major donors. Sweden is a political economy that has undergone a
change in political economy type. By supplementing cross-country analyses with survey data of
foreign aid officials I am able to test important individual-level implications of my argument. I
administered the survey in face-to-face interviews, either in person or on the phone.76
Survey Design and Implementation
My argument posits that aid decision-makers react to changes in the quality of governance in the
recipient country and that aid officials from different political economies differ in the degree to
which they use bypass tactics under conditions of bad governance in the aid-receiving country.
The survey employs a within-subject design which exposed each official to three hypothetical
low-income country scenarios, which differ only in the quality of governance. The anchoring
scenario, Country A, represents a well-performing low income country with relatively low levels
of corruption and strong state institutions.77 Countries B and C are identical to Country A, with
the exception of their governance characteristics. Country B captures weak state institutions
-while corruption levels are relatively low. Country C captures a large-scale corruption scandal
involving public sector officials -while state institutions are relatively strong.78 Subsequent to
presenting each country scenario I asked respondents to answer questions about their aid delivery
preferences in their capacity as aid officials. The first question asked respondents to rank-
order five aid delivery channels including the recipient government, international organizations,
international NGOs, local NGOs, and private sector actors. The scale ranges from 5-“works best
73Table A5 and Figure A5 in the Appendix present the results of the main model in Table 1, Model 4, when
controlling for Initial Governance.
74The current survey response rate is 85 percent.
75Table A5 in the Appendix lists the number of respondents for countries, ministries, and/or agencies.
76Nine respondents requested to take the survey online.
77Country A served the purpose of anchoring the respondents -and was thus not randomized. The large majority
of respondents verbally identified Country A as a “Good Performer”, which served as an implicit manipulation check.
78Country scenarios B and C were presented in random order.
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for my country” to 1-“works worst for my country.” I focus on the rank-order associated with
aid delivered through the recipient government. If respondents rank the recipient government
as as“5” it means that they have a clear No Bypass preference. With descending rank order
values, respondents indicate greater preferences for bypass.
To closely mimic the dependent variable of the observational data analysis I further asked
respondents to indicate their preferences regarding the proportion of government-to-government
aid across the three scenarios. The second question asked respondents to determine the amount
of government-to-government aid out of overall aid flows to the country -with answer categories
including “none,” “some,” “quite a bit,” “a large amount,” and “all.” Similar to the rank-
order measure, the value “5” is associated with a clear No Bypass preference, with lower values
indicating increasing preference for bypass.
Figure 8 shows the point estimates as well as the associated confidence intervals for changes
in quality of governance across aid officials from different political economies. The left panel
of the Figure provides estimates for the channel rank-order measure. The right panel presents
estimates for the aid delivery share outcome measure. The descriptive data confirm my expec-
tations. Officials from both types of political economies have a preference for the government-
to-government channel when the quality of recipient governance is high. In countries with weak
governance or corruption differences among officials from different political economies are pro-
nounced. While the ranking mean is lower across both types of political economies, the mean
of US and Swedish officials is statistically significantly lower. The pattern is the same for the
aid delivery share measure presented in the right panel of Figure 8.
[Figure 8 here]
Next, I estimate difference in differences to measure the effect of deteriorating governance
within subjects. My argument predicts that the change in delivery tactics induced by Country
B and Country C scenarios differs significantly across officials from different political economies.
I expect officials from the United States and Sweden, on average, to change towards greater
bypass than their counterparts from France, Japan, and Germany. The results confirm my
thesis and are consistent with the observational data analysis. Table 2 shows the difference
in differences estimates. The upper half of Table 2 represents the results of the estimates
explaining the rank-order measure, No Bypass -Ranking. The estimated difference between
officials from the two types of political economies as they move from Country A to Country
B is -1.51 and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Moving from Country A to Country
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B yields an statistically significant estimated difference of -1.24 at the 0.01 level. The results
No Bypass -Proportion are presented in the lower half of Table 2. Again, the difference in
response as respondents move from Country A to Country B or C are statistically different
across officials from the the two types of political economies. This suggests that officials of
any background prefer to lower the government-to-government portion of bilateral aid in poorly
governed countries but U.S. and Swedish respondents did so to a higher degree, with statistically
significant differences in means in the case of a corruption scandal or weak state institutions in
recipient countries, respectively.
[Table 2 here]
Why do we see this differential response in delivery tactics across officials? My argument
posits that the organization of public goods delivery at home influences how officials approach
the delivery of foreign aid abroad. Donor officials from countries that rely on markets to max-
imize outcomes prefer delivery tactics that achieve outcomes that are readily measurable and
achievable in the short-run. On the other hand, officials from countries where public sector gov-
ernance emphasizes a strong state in the delivery of public goods focus on collective long-term
solutions that center on state-building efforts and, consequently, focus less on short-run results.
The survey instrument includes two post-treatment questions that aim to tease out differences
on these two dimensions.
The first question asks respondents to identify the appropriate time-horizon for the evaluation
of foreign aid success, measured in number of years. I expect respondents from France, Japan,
and Germany to indicate preferences for longer time horizons than their counterparts from the
United States and Sweden. Subsequently, I ask respondents to identify the appropriate amount
of state-strengthening out of all aid, choosing among answers including “none,” “some,” “quite
a bit,” “a large amount,” and “all.” I expect respondents from France, Japan, and Germany
to exhibit a preference for more state-building aid, while I expect respondents from the United
States and Sweden to exhibit less thereof.
[Table 3 here]
Table 3 presents the results of simple differences. Consistent with my expectations, the mean
number of years considered appropriate for showing the success of aid efforts is lower among
officials from the United States and Sweden, 4.56 years -indicating that their time horizons
are significantly shorter than those among officials from France, Japan, and Germany which
exhibit a mean of 6.27. The difference of 1.71 years is statistically significant at the 0.01
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level. Further, statistically significant differences exist between political economy types when
respondents indicate their preferences for state-building. A value of 5 indicates that ‘all” aid
should be directed towards capacity building. Officials from the United States and Sweden how
a mean of 3, while their French, Japanese, and German counterparts show a higher mean of
3.76. The 0.76 difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. These results buttress my
claim that the differences in public sector governance shape donor governments’ aid delivery
preferences abroad.
While I treat national orientations as exogenous in this paper, I acknowledge that national
orientations are not fixed. In the 1990s, in response to severe economic crises, the Scandinavian
countries political-economic worldviews changed from statist to neoliberal in service provision.
While data limitations preclude me from estimating a cross-national empirical model that eval-
uates within-donor variation in aid delivery, interview and survey evidence with Swedish donor
officials suggests that Sweden’s shift toward market–oriented public goods delivery is reflected
in foreign aid decision-making. A former senior government officials offers pointed support for
this expectation: “Swedish aid policy today stresses results-based management, and therefore
resembles British aid policy a lot more than it used to in the 1980s or 1990s. Results-orientation
starts under the Social Democrats in the wake of the real estate crisis in the 1990s when the
government begins to liberalize the economy to enhance the efficiency of the welfare state. The
budget is tight and there is pressure on the government to justify the aid expense. But results-
orientation is by no means unique to foreign aid. When you look at other policy areas such as
the social transfer system, education, and child care you see similar practices. Today we have
an open market in all areas of public goods in Sweden, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is
developing a so-called “results-based strategy” for foreign aid. They want to make results more
visible to the taxpayer. They want results in the short-term.”79 I evaluated this claim using
my sample of 13 Swedish aid officials. Eleven out of thirteen respondents suggested that time-
horizons in aid evaluation had shrunk over the last twenty years80 and 10 out of 13 respondents
suggested that there currently is less emphasis on state-strengthening than there was twenty
years ago.
79Author interview with former senior government official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, June 17, 2013.
See also Bjerninger 2013
80The question offered a three-fold choice between “smaller,” ”same,” and “greater” time horizons compared to
what their answer was for the present.
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Discussion and Conclusion
This study developed and tested a model of endogenous aid delivery that accounts for hetero-
geneity in donor delivery preferences. The origins of donor officials’ baseline delivery preferences
are based on one important feature of the political economy: the role of the state in goods and
service delivery. I argue that donor governments whose political economies emphasize market-
based delivery systems are more likely to pursue bypass tactics in poorly governed countries to
circumvent aid capture by corrupt elites. As expected I find this prediction to hold for classic
neoliberal political economies as well as for Scandinavian economies. Less market-oriented de-
livery systems are expected to bypass less in poor governance environments. Since their core
orientation favors a stronger role of the government in the delivery of public sector goods, in-
formation about recipient governance will trigger some but not big movements away from the
core orientation. I find statistical support for this prediction. This study thus provides robust
evidence for a prominent research tradition in international relations that studies the domestic
politics of foreign economic policy.
This study informs the aid effectiveness literature as it establishes a link between political
economies and the different kinds of benchmarks that donor officials use to assess aid success.
Donor governments that outsource aid delivery in countries with bad governance may achieve
greater success in providing immediate relief to the poor through easily implementable health
interventions than donor governments that continue to engage in institution-building in col-
laboration with the state. However, outsourcing in foreign aid delivery might hamper or even
undermine donor efforts to build up a state capable of managing its own development -an ob-
jective which ranks high for donor governments that prefer a tactic of greater engagement with
the government in the developing country. While donors often offer a combination of short- and
long-term approaches the results of this study imply that political economies may shape where
donors governments come in on this fundamental dilemma in aid provision.
My study also sheds light on potential trade-offs between aid effectiveness and policy influ-
ence. By setting up parallel structures, market-oriented donor governments may achieve greater
success in providing direct relief to the poor. However, this approach may bring some unin-
tended consequences. By de-emphasizing state-building donor governments may surrender the
opportunity to strengthen relationships with state and local authorities. This may undermine
donor ability to more directly shape policy and governance processes in aid-receiving countries.
This potential dilemma merits further study.
My argument has implications for research that explains donor coordination -a practice
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encouraged by the OECD, on which little progress has been made.81 If differences in national
orientations about the role of the state in goods and service provision make donor coordination
difficult, then we should only expect countries with similar political economies to be able to
coordinate successfully. This presents an interesting area for future research.
This study lays the groundwork for an extension that examines how national orientations
evolve over time and, consequently, affect temporal variation in aid policy within donor countries.
While national orientations -much like domestic structures- are “sticky,” they are a product of
politics where political parties renegotiate views about the appropriate role of the state in pub-
lic goods delivery.82 If, as commonly done, we associate conservative parties with demands for
more market-orientation in service provision, then we should expect a conservative government
to push for more performance-oriented aid delivery tactics. Anecdotal evidence lends support
for this initial contention. Recent victories of conservative parties in market-oriented political
economies, including Canada (2006), Sweden (2007), and the United Kingdom (2010) have led to
reforms in the delivery of foreign aid. These reforms emphasize primarily efficiency criteria. The
British conservatives make this case in their party’s green paper in 2009: “We [the conservative
party, added by author ] are absolutely clear that, as taxpayers feel the pinch, maintaining public
support for our aid programme will require a much greater focus on performance, results and
outcomes. Our bargain with taxpayers is this: in return for your contribution of hard-earned
money it is our duty to spend every penny of aid effectively. [...] We bring a natural scep-
ticism about government schemes. In many developing countries, supporting the state means
supporting a particular group or tribe. Labour sometimes give aid directly to governments
without adequate scrutiny.” 83 In a similar vein, Sweden’s conservative government alliance em-
phasizes performance- and results-orientation, as do conservative parties in Australia, Canada,
and their pendants in other OECD countries. If conservative political party ideology amplifies
market-oriented tactics in public goods provision then we should expect more outsourcing in
aid under conservative governments than governments of the left. Whether exogenous changes
in government affect aid delivery tactics therefore demands further inquiry.
Finally, this study may encourage future research that explores how ideas dovetail with
interests. My argument, as presented above, centers on the role of beliefs about the appropriate
role of the state in service delivery in foreign aid decision-making. Another way of thinking about
the role of ideas in aid delivery is that, over time, ideas about the appropriate role of the state in
81Easterly and Pfu¨tze 2008; Winters 2012; Steinwand Forthcoming.
82See Lancaster 2006 and Lake 2013 for a discussion on the dynamic nature of domestic structures.
83Tories’ Policy Green Paper 2009.
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service delivery facilitate the creation and organization of particular bureaucratic structures.84
These structures, in turn, generate domestic political interests and capabilities that get further
accentuated in foreign policy.85 In foreign aid, the introduction of markets in foreign aid delivery
resulted a reduction of capacity of the aid bureaucracy. Prior to the 1980s, the US government,
through its main aid agency USAID, largely produced design and expertise in-house, sending
many people abroad. In the 1980s the US government turned to markets which resulted in
a significantly weaker bureaucracy in terms of number of employees and expertise. Today,
USAID staff largely assumes managerial functions.86 It acts as a principal whose objectives are
to find the best agent in order to implement aid effectively. Sida in Sweden has experienced
similar changes. On the other hand, more“statist” beliefs, have facilitated the persistence of
strong bureaucratic structures that enable governments to directly implement foreign aid using
in-house capacity and expertise, or by relying on long-institutionalized relationships with non-
state service providers. In France, the AFD (Agence Franc¸aise de De´veloppement) has extensive
in-house capacity for aid policy design and implementation as well as extensive field presence
in nearly all the countries to whom the French government gives aid. Unlike USAID, the AFD
serves as the primary agent for the delivery of French aid. In both types of donor political
economies, ideas serve as true causal priors that affect the type of bureaucratic structures - and
whether the bureaucracy assumes the role of principal or agent. With these different types of
structures come particular sets of public and private domestic interests that seek to perpetuate
existing systems of delivery. These, interests, in turn, contribute to explaining the divergence
over the way that the U.S. and France do aid over the course of the last 50 years. I leave it up to
future research to develop an argument of donor variation in aid delivery that weaves together
ideational and interest-based explanations.
84e.g. Suleiman 2003 explores the effect of public sector reforms on the structure of bureaucracies.
85This view is consistent with Max Weber who suggested that “Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly
govern men’s conduct. Yet very frequently, the ‘world images” that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen,
determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.” in “Social Psychology of the
World’s Religions” p.280; cited in Goldstein and Keohane 1993.
86However, recent reforms under the Obama administration have led to an increase in personnel and capacity.
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Figure 1: Proportion of Bypass Aid for 23 OECD Donors, 2009. Y-axis is fraction
of aid delivered through non-state development actors (e.g. IOs, NGO, for-profit organiza-
tions). X-axis is total aid commitments in constant US$ in millions. Source: OECD CRS








































































































Figure 2: Domestic Government Outsourcing Across Individual Donors. Expen-
ditures on government outsourcing to non-state actors for goods and services used by the
government as percentage of GDP across donor countries in 2009. Source: OECD National
Accounts Database (2011), and authors’ calculation.
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Figure 3: Domestic Government Outsourcing Across Individual Donors and
Political Economies. Expenditures on government outsourcing to non-state actors for
goods and services used by the government as percentage of GDP across political economy
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Figure 4: Proportion of Bypass Aid for OECD Donors in Select Recipient Coun-
tries, 2010. Y-axis is total aid commitments in constant US$ in millions. X-axis is fraction
of aid delivered through non-state development actors. Source: OECD CRS Database (2013),
and authors’ calculation.
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Varieties of Political Economies
Bad Governance Good Governance
Figure 5: Donor Delivery Tactics by Political Economy Types, 2005-2011. Left
panel shows aid delivery patterns for binary political economy division (CMEs and LMEs).
Whisker plots show data range with 95% confidence interval. Diamond-symbol of whisker
plot represents average bypass share in badly governed countries, while square-symbol shows
average bypass share in well-governed countries. Right panel shows same whisker plots for
four-fold political economy typology (statist, neocorporatist, neoliberal, and Scandinavian).
Source: OECD CRS Database (2013), and authors’ calculation.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Lagged Bypass 0.397** 0.506** 0.476** 0.528**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Recipient Governance -1.621** -1.094** 0.337 -0.119 0.301 -0.183 0.814 0.098
(0.31) (0.22) (0.91) (0.94) (0.91) (0.94) (0.92) (0.93)
























Govt Outsourcing/GDP*Rec Gov -0.106* -0.047
(0.06) (0.03)
Govt Outsourcing/GDP 0.416** 0.262**
(0.13) (0.07)
Democracy -0.177* -0.117* -0.256 -0.215 -0.267 -0.224 -0.238 -0.196
(0.09) (0.07) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29)
Natural Disaster Deaths 0.070** 0.023 -0.009 -0.023 -0.005 -0.021 -0.008 -0.020
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Civil Conflict 0.785** 0.484** 0.208 -0.034 0.193 -0.047 0.172 -0.058
(0.25) (0.19) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.28)
Distance 0.179 0.036 -1.653** -1.206** -0.403* -0.407** -0.814** -0.656**
(0.21) (0.18) (0.25) (0.17) (0.23) (0.16) (0.24) (0.15)
Former Colony 0.434 0.252 2.889** 1.543** 2.838** 1.511** 2.732** 1.362**
(0.32) (0.22) (0.71) (0.68) (0.72) (0.68) (0.71) (0.68)
Trade Intensity -0.104** -0.053* -0.289** -0.143** -0.284** -0.143** -0.265** -0.128**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Security Council -0.188 -0.163 -0.193 -0.153 -0.178 -0.136 -0.195 -0.134
(0.32) (0.21) (0.29) (0.21) (0.30) (0.21) (0.29) (0.21)
Total Aid per capita -0.068** -0.074* -0.114** -0.076* -0.132** -0.058 -0.097** -0.016
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
Social Sector Aid -0.027** -0.015* -0.029** -0.010 -0.010 -0.004 -0.044** -0.015*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Democracy Aid -0.005 -0.006 0.012 -0.007 0.014 -0.007 0.039** 0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Year 0.600** 0.554**
(0.05) (0.05)
Major Power -2.573** -0.820** -1.693** -0.679** -2.518** -0.812**
(0.21) (0.16) (0.19) (0.15) (0.22) (0.16)
R squared 0.358 0.476 0.221 0.441 0.262 0.454 0.190 0.433
N 10605 8760 10605 8760 10605 8760 10605 8760
Table 1: Donor Political Economy and Bypassing Governments in Aid-
Receiving Countries, 2005-2011. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Constant
(all columns) not reported; region dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin-America, Middle
East, Asia and Eastern Europe as omitted category (Models 1,2) are not reported; donor fixed
effects (Models 1 and 2); year fixed effects (Models 3 to 8); recipient fixed effects (Models 3
to 8) 6
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Figure 6: Marginal Effects of Political Economy Types Across Quality of Re-
cipient Governance. Left panel: effects of binary political economy division estimated
by Model 4. Right panel: effects of four-fold political economy division estimated by Model
6. Stars signal statistical significance at 0.05 level from from the omitted “other” category
(Spain, Portugal, and Greece), but not from each other. Sources: OECD CRS Database
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As Quality of Governance changes
Figure 7: Marginal Effect of Government Outsourcing on Bypass Share Across
Quality of Recipient Governance. Sources: OECD CRS Database (2013), OECD Na-
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Figure 8: Point Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals for “No Bypass” Aid
Delivery Rank-Order and ‘No Bypass” Share of All Bilateral Aid by Donor
Political Economy Across Governance Scenarios. Left Panel: “No Bypass” rank-
order measure. Right Panel: ‘No Bypass” share measure. Country A: Good Performer,
Country B: Weak State Institutions, Low Corruption, Country C: Good Performer, Cor-
ruption Scandal. Source: Survey data of senior aid officials from France, Germany, Japan,
United States, and Sweden.
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Country A to B Country A to C
Diff-in-Diff Diff-in-Diff
No Bypass -Ranking -1.51*** -1.24***
Std. Error 0.37 0.43
R square 0.51 0.46
No Bypass -Proportion -0.75*** -0.54***
Std. Error 0.26 0.29
R square 0.52 0.49
Table 2: Difference-in-Difference Estimates Of Aid Delivery Ranking by Donor
Political Economy. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. In the top half of the ta-
ble, respondents evaluate Country A (Good Performer), followed by Country C (Corruption
Scandal). In the lower half of the table, respondents evaluate Country A (Good Performer),
followed by Country C (Weak State Institutions) “No Bypass -Ranking” is based on rank-
order of aid delivery preferences -“5” indicating recipient government is first choice. “No
Bypass -Proportion” is based on proportional measure for aid delivery preferences -“5” in-
dicating all aid should go through the recipient government. Source: Survey Data of Senior
Aid Officials from France, Germany, Japan, United States, and Sweden
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N Mean Std. Err. Diff. t-stat p-value
Time Horizon - FRA/GER/JAP 31 6.33 0.44
Time Horizon - USA/SWE 26 4.81 0.41 1.52 2.49 0.01
State-Building Efforts - FRA/GER/JAP 31 3.74 0.09
State-Building Efforts - USA/SWE 26 3.03 0.13 0.71 4.51 0.00
Table 3: Simple T-test Results Of Time Horizon Associated with Aid Success
and Importance of State-building Efforts as Share of Overall Efforts. “Time
Horizon” captures number of years after which respondents measure success of foreign aid.
“State-Building Efforts” captures the ratio of aid allocated towards state-building versus direct
aid -“5” indicating all aid should be used to build state capacity and no aid should be allocated
for direct relief purposes. Source: Survey data of senior aid officials from France, Germany,




This section provides a brief discussion of the statistical implications of using a proportional out-
come measure, which requires compositional data analysis. For any donor-recipient dyad the aid
channel share is positive and the sum of the aid channels shares must be one hundred percent.
Consider the aid share A, in donor-recipient dyad i for channel j. The compositional nature of
the variable is expressed by the constraints that the fraction of the aid share that government-to-
government or non-state channels might receive is doubly bounded, falling between 0 and 1,
Ai,j ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i, j, (1)
with Ai,j denoting the fraction of the aid in donor-recipient dyad i (i=1, ..., N) for delivery
channel j (j=1, J). Government-to-government aid and non-state aid in a given donor-recipient
dyad sums to unity,
J∑
j=1
Aij = 1 ∀ i, j, (2)
where J is the total number of delivery channels, which equal 2 (government-to-government
and non-state aid) in my case.
Following Aitchison (1986), I create a (J − 1) log aid ratio, which compares the non-state aid
to government-to-government aid:
Yi1 = ln(Ai1/Ai2) = ln(Ai1/(1 −Ai1) (3)
The advantage of log transforming proportional outcomes is that the outcome is unconstrained,
allowing for a straightforward estimation through OLS. The coefficient of the log-transformed non-
state share variable then describes how the log ratio of non-state aid changes with respect to
government-to-government aid. After modeling, the estimates are transformed back into their
original scale of interest:
Ai1 = (1 + e
−Yi1)
−1. (4)
















































































































Figure 1: Domestic Government Outsourcing Across Individual Donors. Expenditures
on government outsourcing to non-state actors for goods and services used by the government as
percentage of government spending (excluding transfers) across donor countries in 2009. Source:
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Figure 2: Histogram, Quality of Recipient Governance
3
Variable Observations Mean St. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Bypass (log-transf) 8760 .80 7.56 -20.00 18.66
Lagged Bypass (log-transf) 8760 0.50 7.69 -20.00 13.33
Governance 8760 1.92 0.62 .04 3.87
LME 8760 0.41 0.49 0 1
LME*Recipient Governance 8760 0.79 1.02 0 3.87
CME 8760 0.44 0.49 0 1
CME*Recipient Governance 8760 0.84 1.04 0 3.87
Major Power 8760 .27 .44 0 1
Democracy 8760 -4.14 1.66 -7 -1
Log(Disaster Deaths) 8760 2.06 3.38 -2.31 12.34
Civil Conflict 8760 .17 .38 0 1
Log(Distance) 8760 8.30 .58 5.72 9.41
Former Colony 8760 .66 .47 0 1
Log(Trade Intensity) 8760 3.90 3.51 -27.63 13.07
Security Council 8760 .05 .27 0 1
Log(Total Aid) 8760 -15.49 2.75 -26.31 -6.65
Log(Democracy Aid) 8760 -9.46 12.91 -27.63 7.87
Log(Social Sector Aid) 8760 -6.64 11.74 -27.63 7.09
Table 1: Descriptive Statistic of Estimation Sample; Table 1 Model 4
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3













Govt Outsourcing/GDP*Rec Gov -0.10**
0.03
N 8760 8760 8760
Table 2: Donor Political Economy and Bypassing Governments in Aid-Receiving Coun-
tries, 2005-2011; Three-Way-Fixed Effects (donor, recipient, year). +p < 0.10, ∗p <
0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01. Only interaction coefficients reported. Model 1 adds donor fixed effects to Ta-
ble 1 Model 4, which estimates results based on binary political economy division. Model 2 adds
donor fixed effects to Table 1 Model 6, which estimates results based on four-fold political economy
division. Model 3 adds donor fixed effects to Table 1 Model 8, which estimates results based on the
domestic outsourcing measure.
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Figure 3: Plots of Interaction Coefficients of Three-Way Fixed Effects Political Econ-
omy Type Models, Appendix Table 2, Models 1 and 2. Left panel: plot based on Appendix
Table 2, Model 1 (binary political economy division); Right panel: plot based on Appendix Table 1,
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Figure 4: Plots of Interaction Coefficients of Three-Way Fixed Effects Government
Outsourcing Model, Appendix Table 2, Model 3. Plot based on Appendix Table 2, Model 3.
Sources: OECD CRS Database (2013), and authors’ calculation.
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Model 1 Model 2
Lagged Bypass 0.529**
(0.01)
Recipient Governance 0.772 0.005
(0.94) (0.93)
Govt Outsourcing/Govt Expenditure 0.081** 0.041**
(0.03) (0.01)




Natural Disaster Deaths -0.008 -0.020
(0.03) (0.03)




Former Colony 2.789** 1.366**
(0.71) (0.68)
Trade Intensity -0.264** -0.130**
(0.06) (0.04)
Security Council -0.197 -0.136
(0.29) (0.21)
Major Power -2.552** -0.837**
(0.22) (0.17)
Total Aid per capita -0.098** -0.013
(0.02) (0.05)
Democracy Aid 0.042** 0.006
(0.01) (0.01)
Social Sector Aid -0.047** -0.019**
(0.01) (0.01)
R squared 0.189 0.432
N 10605 8760
Table 3: Donor Government Outsourcing as % of Gov’t Spending and Bypassing Gov-
ernments in Aid-Receiving Countries, 2005-2011. +p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
Constant (all columns) not reported; two-way year and recipient country fixed effects (Models 1 and
2); lagged bypass (Model 2).
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Lagged Bypass 0.475** 0.508**
(0.02) (0.02)
Recipient Governance 1.228 0.125 0.284 -0.203
(1.03) (1.13) (0.91) (0.93)
LMEs*Rec Gov -0.653 -0.377 -0.641* -0.388
(0.42) (0.35) (0.38) (0.29)
LMEs 6.234** 3.852** 5.606** 3.346**
(0.92) (0.76) (0.84) (0.62)
CMEs*Rec Gov 0.457 0.383 0.408 0.243
(0.48) (0.37) (0.45) (0.30)
CMEs 2.206** 1.262 1.682* 1.023
(0.96) (0.76) (0.92) (0.63)
Democracy -0.308 -0.392 -0.155 -0.150
(0.29) (0.33) (0.28) (0.28)
Natural Disaster Deaths 0.003 -0.016 -0.001 -0.014
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Civil Conflict 0.161 0.023 0.203 -0.038
(0.28) (0.36) (0.28) (0.28)
Distance -1.398** -1.250** -1.643** -1.185**
(0.28) (0.20) (0.25) (0.17)
Former Colony 1.305 0.827 2.236** 1.172
(1.47) (1.57) (0.75) (0.72)
Trade Intensity -0.244** -0.147** -0.283** -0.139**
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
Security Council -0.304 -0.314 -0.122 -0.134
(0.30) (0.25) (0.30) (0.22)
Number of NGOs 1.776 4.200
(5.68) (5.46)
Number of IGOs -0.586 -0.677
(1.04) (1.00)
Number of NGOs and IGOs 3.600** 2.310**
(0.46) (0.44)
Major Power -2.788** -0.794** -2.593** -0.795**
(0.22) (0.19) (0.22) (0.16)
Total Aid per capita -0.140** -0.106** -0.119** -0.085*
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
Democracy Aid 0.022* -0.001 0.014 -0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Social Sector Aid -0.017 -0.000 -0.026** -0.008
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R squared 0.223 0.420 0.221 0.441
N 8257 6582 10346 8544
Table 4: Donor Political Economy and Bypassing Governments in Aid-Receiving Coun-
tries, 2005-2011. +p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01. Constant (all columns) not reported;
two-way year and recipient fixed effects (Models 1 to 4); lagged bypass variable (Models 2 and 4).
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Lagged Bypass 0.506** 0.536**
(0.01) (0.01)
Initial Recipient Governance 5.183** -0.049 3.398** -0.182
(0.67) (0.34) (0.63) (0.20)
Recipient Governance 0.337 -1.316** -0.119 -0.661**
(0.91) (0.49) (0.94) (0.33)
CMEs*Rec Gov 0.400 0.256 0.263 0.206
(0.44) (0.42) (0.29) (0.27)
CMEs 1.716* 1.881** 1.004 0.928
(0.89) (0.87) (0.61) (0.56)
LMEs*Rec Gov -0.751* -0.879** -0.419 -0.406
(0.38) (0.37) (0.28) (0.25)
LMEs 5.884** 5.924** 3.448** 3.114**
(0.85) (0.83) (0.60) (0.54)
Democracy -0.256 -0.157 -0.215 -0.084
(0.29) (0.11) (0.29) (0.06)
Natural Disaster Deaths -0.009 0.152** -0.023 0.068**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Civil Conflict 0.208 0.694** -0.034 0.321*
(0.27) (0.29) (0.28) (0.19)
Distance -1.653** -0.727** -1.206** -0.474**
(0.25) (0.22) (0.17) (0.12)
Former Colony -1.014 0.833** -1.016 0.486**
(1.15) (0.31) (1.08) (0.17)
Trade Intensity -0.289** -0.297** -0.143** -0.134**
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Security Council -0.193 0.148 -0.153 0.053
(0.29) (0.31) (0.21) (0.20)
Major Power -2.573** -3.057** -0.820** -0.991**
(0.21) (0.19) (0.16) (0.14)
Total Aid per capita -0.114** -0.116** -0.076* -0.086**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Democracy Aid 0.012 0.025** -0.007 0.000
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Social Sector Aid -0.029** -0.024** -0.010 -0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R squared 0.221 0.172 0.441 0.425
N 10605 10605 8760 8760
Table 5: Donor Political Economy and Bypassing Governments in Aid-Receiving Coun-
tries, 2005-2011. +p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01. Constant (all columns) not reported; year
fixed effects (no recipient fixed effects) in Models 2 and 4; two-way year and recipient fixed effects
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Marginal Effects of Donor Political Economy on Bypass Across Quality of Recipient Governance
Figure 5: Marginal Effects of Political Economy Types Across Quality of Recipient
Governance, Controlling for Initial Governance Conditions in Recipient Country. Ef-
fects of binary political economy division estimated in Appendix Table A4, Model 3. Stars signal
statistical significance at 0.05 level. Sources: OECD CRS Database (2013), and authors’ calcula-
tion.
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Number of Respondents Agency Country
4 State Department United States
4 USAID United States
2 Millennium Challenge Corporation United States
1 Treasury United States
1 Office of Budget and Management United States
6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sweden
7 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency Sweden
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs France
4 French Agency for Development France
3 Ministry of Finance France
9 Ministry of Development Cooperation Germany
4 Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW) Germany
3 Ministry for Foreign Affairs Japan
2 Japanese International Cooperation Agency Japan
Table 6: Survey respondents by agency and country.
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